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Keynes' General Theory (1936) is arguably one of the most important books of the twentieth 
century. His ideas for stabilizing the aggregate economy have profoundly influenced 
economic theory as well as popular opinion about what governments can and should do with 
respect to the business cycle. On the other hand, whether Keynesian theory has substantially 
altered the course of public policy remains an open question. In this paper we identify the 
elements required for any investigation of the impact of Keynes' ideas on policy choices and 
then conduct our own 'search for Keynes', applying an intertemporal spatial voting framework 
to study the fiscal history of the Government of Canada from 1870 to 2000. The long time 
series allows the construction of a counterfactual – one of several essential elements - 
showing what governments would have planned to do ‘after Keynes’, if Keynes' ideas had not 
in fact been present. Our results suggest that textbook Keynesianism is identifiable in the 
Canadian data. 
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Keynes' General Theory (1936) is arguably one of the most important books of the twentieth century. 
His ideas for stabilizing the aggregate economy have profoundly influenced economic theory as well 
as popular opinion about what governments can and should do with respect to the business cycle. On 
the other hand, whether Keynesian theory has substantially altered the course of public policy 
remains an open question. In this paper we identify the elements required for any investigation of the 
impact of Keynes' ideas on policy choices and then conduct our own 'search for Keynes', applying 
an intertemporal spatial voting framework to study the fiscal history of the Government of 
Canada from 1870 to 2000. The long time series allows the construction of a counterfactual - one 
of several essential elements - showing what governments would have planned to do >after Keynes=, 
if Keynes' ideas had not in fact been present. Our results suggest that textbook Keynesianism is 
identifiable in the Canadian data. 
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This [revolutionary] extension of the role of the state was, implicitly, of a general and over-all nature, 
involving all departments of government; but in accordance with Keynesian economic theory, the greater 
part of this new responsibility came to focus on particular aspects of governmental operations--its fiscal 
and monetary policies; and what was called for in fiscal policy especially was an even more radical 
break with the traditions of the past. 
        H. Scott Gordon, 1965 
 
1.   Introduction 
  The idea that national governments can stabilize aggregate economic activity, introduced by 
John Maynard Keynes in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), is one of 
the most important innovations in economic policy thinking of the twentieth century. His ideas have 
profoundly influenced economic theory as well as popular opinion about what governments can and 
should do with respect to the business cycle. On the other hand, whether Keynes' arguments have 
actually changed the course of public policy remains an open question. In this paper we consider the 
elements that are required in order to address that question, and then conduct our own 'search for 
Keynes'. We narrow our investigation by focusing on fiscal policy which, as Scott Gordon notes, was 
the most radical element of the Keynesian prescription.
1
  Since we are concerned with the implications of Keynesianism for policy choices, a key 
requirement is a behavioral model of public policy. The framework that we develop is an intertempo-
ral extension of a spatial voting model that to makes use of ideas from probabilistic voting theory 
(Coughlin, Mueller and Murrell 1990, Hinich and Munger 1994), modelling of the permanent or long 
run size of government (for example, Alt and Chrystal 1983), the macroeconomics of liquidity 
constraints (Campbell and Mankiw 1990, Holtz-Eakin, Rosen and Tilly 1994) and tax smoothing 
(Barro 1979, 1986). In this framework Keynesianism, if it exists, appears as a change in the process 
governing the ex ante transitory or shorter run components of equilibrium policy choices.  
  While the framework be adapted to study other competitive political systems, we look for 
evidence of attempts at Keynesian stabilization in the fiscal policy choices of the Government of  
                                                 
1 The data used in this study are specified in a manner consistent with the relationship between the central govern-









Canada using data from 1870 to 2000.
2  The Canadian case is of particular interest for a number of  
reasons. The White Paper on Employment and Income in 1945 signalled the acceptance of Keynesian 
ideas in senior policy circles and R.B. Bryce, one of Keynes= early students, played an important role 
for many years in the Department of Finance.
3 The long time series is required in order to construct a 
counterfactual  showing what governments would have planned to do if Keynesianism had not in fact 
been present.  
  In section two we identify the elements, including the counterfactual, that we think are 
essential to assess of the role of Keynesianism. A model of fiscal policy 'before' and 'after' Keynes 
that meets these requirements is developed in section three, and in section four a system of semi-
reduced form estimating equations and a test for Keynes are derived. Following Bryce (1986), one 
might date the Keynesian period in Canada from 1939, but with the disruption of World War II we 
must effectively begin our search only after its end. Estimation of the model of non-interest federal 
spending, taxation, and the deficit net of interest paid to the private sector is presented in section five, 
and our test for the presence of Keynesianism is implemented. Brief conclusions complete the paper. 
Mathematical details are given in an Appendix and data sources are fully described in a companion 
working paper (Ferris and Winer 2003). 
 
2.  Essential Elements  
  A statement about the impact of Keynes on what governments planned to do implies that we 
think we know what would have happened 'after Keynes' had his ideas not influenced the course of 
public policy.
4 To answer this question we explicitly construct such a counterfactual - our first 
essential element - by estimating a model of policy based on the 1870 to 1938 time period before  
Keynesian ideas could come into effect.  This model is then used to forecast into the period 'after  
                                                 
2 The modern state in Canada begins in 1867.  
3 For histories of Keynesianism in Canada, see Gordon (1965), Campbell (1987, 1991), as well as Bryce (1986). 









Keynes'. Our tests for the existence and strength of Keynesian stabilization policy are based on the 
study of how policy evolves 'after Keynes' relative to this counterfactual. 
  Explicit use of the counterfactual allows for the likelihood that, even 'before Keynes', policy 
choices are correlated with the cycle. Prior to Keynes, governments had to deal with voters who 
found themselves in economic distress and may well have responded in a manner that looks, but 
could not be, Keynesian. On balance, one suspects that 19th century governments behaved differ-
ently, perhaps more conservatively, with respect to the business cycle. (Estimation will shed light on 
this matter). But whatever the case, there is no reason why policy choices should be unaffected by 
shorter run developments 'before Keynes'.  This fact must be taken into account in deciding whether 
or not there is a systematic change in the nature of policy choices 'after'. 
  Second, since Keynesian stabilization concerns the nature of a government's response to 
shorter run or transitory macro-economic events, it is necessary to distinguish between longer run or 
permanent policy actions, such as its response to an expected increase in permanent income, and its 
transitory or cyclical actions. Most studies of public policy do not distinguish between permanent and 
transitory elements in policy actions. (See, however, Alt and Chrystal 1983, Goff 1998, and Barro 
1986). In the context of macroeconomic policy in Canada, Kneebone and McKenzie (1999) also 
recognize the need to remove the permanent part of the process governing policy choices and do so 
by using a Hodrick-Prescott trend. As Canova (1998) and others have emphasized, the choice of the 
long run model used to de-trend is crucial in macroeconomics and we should expect it to be impor-
tant in the present context as well. In our case, we model long run policy choices explicitly. 
  Third, we are interested in planned policy actions and not in unintended outcomes. Tradition-
ally, the study of Keynesian stabilization has distinguished discretionary (or structural) from auto-
matic (or cyclical) aspects of fiscal policy. Discretionary changes are typically defined as those 
resulting from the adjustment of policy parameters like a tax rate, while automatic components are 









discretionary component is often estimated by constructing a counterfactual showing what policy 
would have been this year had unemployment remained unchanged, using an autoregressive forecast-
ing model that includes unemployment rates, with the difference between the hypothetical policy and 
last year's actual policy serving as the measure of discretionary change. This methodology may be 
useful for studying how actual budgets fluctuate with the cycle, but it does not yield a behavioral 
model of ex ante policy choices.  
  The discretionary versus automatic policy literature is immense.  Work of this sort on Canada 
includes Will (1967), Gillespie (1979), Boothe and Davidson (1993), Wilson and Dungan (1993) and 
Boothe and Petchey (1995). These studies conclude generally that the discretionary component of 
policy is small compared to the total and often awkwardly timed from the perspective of Keynesian 
stabilization theory. (See, however, McKenzie and Kneebone 1999 who do find evidence of substan-
tial discretionary changes in policy in the 1990's.) Thus, on our reading, this literature suggest that 
the evidence for the adoption of Keynesianism in Canada is not strong, unless one argues that 
Keynesian thinking led to an increased reliance on policies that act as automatic stabilizers, a conclu-
sion that calls into question the initial distinction between automatic and discretionary policy.
5
 Fourth, the framework of analysis should incorporate a reason why Keynesian stabilization  
might be employed, so that the model of policy 'after Keynes' can be properly specified. For this 
reason, the model of the transitory components of policy must be formulated explicitly rather than 
modeled agnostically as general adjustment terms.
6 We interpret Keynesian stabilization as an 
attempt to capture the social benefits from internalizing the externalities inherent in an economy with 
liquidity constrained citizens, a seminal interpretation of Keynes' theory due to Leijonhufvud (1968). 
The model we develop therefore contains both liquidity-constrained and unconstrained citizens, and 
                                                 
5 One should note that in a political economy setting, the distinction between discretionary and automatic policy is 
problematic. A political decision not to change a policy parameter in the face of expected changes in activity is just 
as active a policy as the opposite. See Ferris and Winer (2003) for an extensive critique of the automatic/ discretion-
ary approach. 
6 That is, the model must be more specific about the short run processes than, say, an error correction model that 









is informed by Campbell and Mankiw (1990), and by Holtz-Eakin, Rosen and Tilly (1994) who first 
applied this work to the study of government
7. Tax smoothing on behalf of both types of voters (as in 
Barro 1986) is then but one feature of a politically profitable fiscal platform. Consumption smoothing 
for liquidity-constrained voters and the trade-off between satisfying the political demands of liquid-
ity-constrained voters and those not so constrained play important roles in motivating the choices 
made by governments in the model developed in section three.   
  Fifth, it is necessary to allow for structural changes in the public sector that may have nothing 
to do with Keynesianism, but which affect the responsiveness of the fiscal system to the cycle. In our 
case the rise of the income tax and the maturation of the welfare system since World War II has 
altered the responsiveness of budgets to the cycle and needs to be controlled for. Hence while we are 
critical of the automatic/discretionary decomposition, its good sense is its allowance for the (as-
sumed) unrelated influence of the welfare state on the cyclicality of fiscal policies. In one particular 
version of our model, we control for the role of the welfare state by explicitly allowing for the 
gradual development of the welfare system over the post-war period.     
  Sixth and finally, we must construct the time series that represents the longer and shorter run 
economic developments (or expected shocks) to which the government planned to respond, and do so 
in a manner that allows historical work over the long period of time required for the construction of a 
counterfactual.  
  Our overall approach is summarized in Figure 1. Here we illustrate the model of planned  
policy 'before Keynes' (before 1938) and the forecast into the post World War Two period based on 
this model that constitutes the counterfactual. In each case policy consists of a long run, shown as 
constant for simplicity, and transitory action that varies with the cycle. The figure also illustrates the 
systematic part of policy 'after Keynes', and what we shall call the policy differential - the difference 
between an estimate of planned policy after Keynes and that of the counterfactual. In the case 
                                                 










illustrated, policy after Keynes is more countercyclical than in the counterfactual, indicating the 
presence of textbook Keynesian stabilization. Our tests for the existence of Keynesian policy involve 
the estimation of regressions to explain changes in these policy differentials.            
[Figure 1 here] 
 
3.  Political Equilibrium 
  Since we are concerned with the nature of public policy, it is important to show that our 
estimating equations are consistent with collective choice. To do so we extend the spatial voting 
model to an intertemporal setting where some proportion of voters are liquidity constrained and 
where there is a distinction between longer run and shorter run components of ex ante policy choices. 
To develop this we consider in turn: policy platforms, government budget constraints and the private 
economy, voting behaviour, party objectives, and the political equilibrium.  
3.1  Platforms, government budget constraints and the private economy  
  A policy platform {g, t, b}= {gt,...gt+s ,...g4 ; tt,...tt+s ,...t4 ; bt,...bt+s ,..b4 }offered by either of 
two political parties is a set of fiscal policies for the current and all future periods that the party 
thinks voters will care about. Here g is real per capita non-interest expenditure, t is real per capita  
current tax revenue, and b is real per capita public debt privately held. The time horizon is infinite for 
convenience; the estimating equations allow us to remain agnostic about the politically relevant 
horizon. The common set of feasible platforms from which parties choose is assumed to be compact 
and convex. The flow government budget constraints applying to these policies are 
      ,                            (1a)   t+s t+s t+s t+s-1 t+s-1 t+s  =  + [(   )     ] ;      s  =  0 ,  1 ,...    g tb b b r −− ∞
and the general equilibrium structure of the private economy is represented simply by a function  
H(g, t, b, x) = 0,                                                                     (1b) 










3.2  Voting behaviour 
  As already noted, there are two types of voters. Type 1 voters are liquidity constrained while 
type 2 chose only in relation to their permanent income. Within types, individuals are assumed to be 
homogeneous. Using EtU2 to represent the indirect expected utility of a type 2 voter who is not 
liquidity constrained,   
 E tU2 = 3
4 β
s E tµ[c*t+s(H(.)), R*t+s(H(.)); {g, t, b}t+s] ;        s = 0,1,...4                      (2)   
where a '*' denotes optimal private choices of individuals of private consumption ct+s and leisure R t+s   
and β
s = [1/(1+ ρ)]
s is the subjective discount factor with given rate of time preference ρ.  Similarly, 
the indirect utility of a type 1 voter who is liquidity constrained is 
                EtU1 = 3
4β
sEtµ[c*t+s(H(.); yt), R*t+s(H(.); yt); {g, t, b}t+s ],      s =  0,1...4.                 (3) 
EtU1 differs from EtU2 only because the liquidity constrained individual=s evaluation of government 
depends upon the realization of a vector of stochastic current period variables yt. In this section, we 
define y as a deviation from long run that is welfare improving for liquidity constrained voters, such 
as an expected increase in current income above its long run level. 
  The individual voting decision is based on two factors: the level of expected utility generated 
by a party's proposed platform compared to that offered by the opposition and the voter's evaluation 
of the non-policy characteristics of the party (assumed to be stochastic from the political parties' 
perspective).
8 The latter include candidate personalities, perceived competency, and reputation for 
carrying out promises. The party's view of the expected utility received by a voter of type j from the 
platform offered by party k, Vj
k , 
 is the sum of these parts:  Vj
k  = EtUj [g(k), t(k), b(k)] + ξj
k  =  
E tUj(k) + ξj
k ,  where ξj
k describes the utility generated by the non-policy related characteristics of 
party k and its candidates.  
  With the political process consisting of an incumbent party (i) and an opposition (o), we may  
then define the non-policy bias of a representative voter of type j in favor of the opposition o as   
                                                 











o  =  ξj
o - ξj
i 
.   By definition this non-policy bias is independent of policy choices.  
  The voting behaviour of individuals, from the perspective of the two parties, can now be 
described following Coughlin, Mueller and Murrell (1990). The probability that an individual of type 
j votes for the opposition rather than the incumbent is        
o
o tt jj j
j
1 i f { U( o )   -   U( i ) }  >   EE  =     p




 ,     
where Et[Uj(o)] and Et[Uj(i)] represent the levels of expected utility associated with the policy 
platforms of the opposition and the incumbent. To get a voter of either type on side, the opposition 
must deliver enough welfare to overcome the non-policy bias of the voter in favour of the incumbent.  
  We assume that from each party=s perspective, the non-policy bias of a representative voter of 




max). Then the probability 
at time t that a representative individual of type j will vote for, say, the opposition, is equal to the 
probability that φ
j is less than the utility differential generated by the opposition party:  
     Fjt {Et Uj(o) - Et Uj(i)} = αj @{ Et Uj(o) - Et Uj(i) - φ
j min },  (4) 
where Fj is the cumulative distribution function of φ





is the sensitivity of the voting probability to a change in welfare.  
  Assuming that [EtUj(o) - EtUj(i)] lies everywhere within the interval on which φ
j is defined 
ensures that parties believe that every voter has some positive probability of voting for it, even if that 
probability may be small. Consequently, no party will completely ignore any voter of either type.
9  
This last assumption plus the probabilistic nature of voting makes the objective function of each 
party globally continuous in its policy instruments. 
3.3   Party objectives and political equilibrium  
  Parties choose policies to maximize expected votes or, equivalently, their expected plurality.  
                                                 
9  If this were not true, and the probability that some voters will support one of the parties falls to zero, a Nash 
equilibrium may not exist since the objective function of the parties, defined immediately below, may not be 









With Nt1 type1voters and λt (= Nt1/Nt) equalling the fraction of the population that is liquidity 
constrained, the expected number of votes that the opposition party maximizes is   
EVt(o) = Nt  λt  F1t + Nt (1-λt) F2t.                                                (5)                          
Correspondingly, the expected vote for the incumbent is EVt(i) = Nt - EVt(o).   
  A pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this electoral game exists if, after the substitution of all 
relevant constraints on policy choices, both expected vote functions are strictly concave in each 
policy instrument for every platform chosen by the opposition. The existence of an equilibrium and 
the concavity of expected vote functions are discussed at length in Enelow and Hinich (1989). Here 
we note that concavity is equivalent to assuming that each party can design a vote-maximizing 
platform and assume that the concavity condition required for the existence of a Nash equilibrium is 
satisfied.  
  In an equilibrium, then, policy platforms converge so that the identity of the party in power is 
incidental to the determination of policy. Strict concavity of the expected vote functions and the fact 
that from (4), voting depends only on utility differences, means that no party gains a lasting advan-
tage by adopting a platform that differs from that of its opposition (see Enelow and Hinich 1989 for 
proof). Since party platforms converge in equilibrium, we may drop the subscripts identifying the 
individual party and refer only to the governing party or government.  
  A convenient and well-known feature of Nash equilibrium in the probabilistic voting frame-
work is that policy choices can be characterized as the maximum of a political support function that 
is a particular weighted sum of individual expected utilities (Coughlin and Nitzan 1981, Hettich and 
Winer1999).
10 Substituting from above into the expected vote function (5), this theorem indicates  
that the equilibrium policy platform can found as the solution to maximizing the weighted sum of the  
expected indirect utility of the two types of voters (Et µ
j , j=1,2), subject to constraints (1a) and (1b):  
              
                                                 









 Max  ‹t   =  θ1t  @  3
4β
s Et µ
1[gt+s(H(.)), c*t+s(H(.)), R*t+s(H(.)); yt+s]     
{gt,...,gt+s,gt+s+1...,tt,...tt+s,tt+s+1...,bt,..bt+s, bt+s+1,...} 
 
                            +  θ2 t @  3
4 β
s Et µ
2[gt+s(H(.)), c*t+s(H(.)), R*t+s(H(.))]                                      (6) 
             
            +  3
4 ψt+s{J
sR
s}[tt+s + (bt+s ! bt+s-1) ! rt+sbt+s-1 !  gt+s ] ,     
   
where the expectation Et is conditional on the information available at time t-1 and the summation 
runs from s = 0 to s = +4. R
s = 1/(1+rt+s), where r is the interest rate, and the political influence 
weights θ1 = Ntλtα1 and θ2 = Nt(1-λt)α2 are the population weighted derivatives in (4) that reflect the 
political sensitivity of voters in each group. 
  The intuition is straightforward. Unless this weighted sum of utilities is optimized, the 
opposition party can find a platform that will improve its chances of electoral success by making 
someone better off. Political competition insures that in equilibrium, no such platform remains. 
However, this does not mean that all voters are treated equally. In moving towards the Pareto fron-
tier, every party will trade support from less politically sensitive voters for the support of voters 
whose political weight θj is relatively high.
11  
  The problem set up in (6) implies that in equilibrium, public policy will balance the shorter 
and longer run interests of liquidity and non-liquidity constrained voters. This is an intertemporal 
extension of pluralist politics to a framework suitable for an investigation of Keynesianism.  
 
4.  Derivation of Estimating Equations and Testing for Keynes 
  To simplify notation, we temporarily ignore the distinction between expected and known 
quantities and treat the x's and y's as single variables, even though they may refer to vectors of long-
run factors and transitory developments respectively. Accordingly, from (6) the first order conditions 
of an internal optimum for gt+s, tt+s and bt+s at time t+s are: 
 
                                                 
11 The support function is not a special type of welfare function. Rather the weights θ on utilities are determined 









M‹t/Mgt+s =  β
s{θ1Et[µ
1
g               (H(xt+s),yt+s)] + θ2Et[µ
2
g (H(xt+s))]} ! J
 sR
 sψt+s = 0,                             (7) 
     M‹t/Mtt+s  =  β
s{θ1Et[µ
1




 sψt+s = 0,                               (8) 
            M‹t/Mbt+s  =  β
s{θ1Et[µ
1
b (H(xt+s),yt+s)] ! θ2Et [µ
2
b (H(xt+s))]} ! β
s+1{θ1Et[µ
1
t      (H(xt+s+1),yt+s+1)]                  
+ θ2Et[µ
2
t (H(xt+s+1)]} + J
sR
s[ψt+s - ψt+s+1] = 0.                                                      (9) 
Here we see that in equilibrium, expected vote maximizing behaviour means that planned govern-
ment spending, taxes and borrowing will be adjusted until each becomes equally productive at 
winning votes on the margin. These first order conditions can be used to determine the planned 
changes in the levels of policy variables over time in a political equilibrium
12. This reformulation 
provides our estimating equations. In what follows we concentrate on the government spending 
equation; the equations for taxation and the deficit are analogous and are stated later.  
  Predictions for changes in the level of government spending over time can be derived by first  
taking the ratio of first order conditions across adjacent time periods t+s-1 and t+s: 
12
tt + s t + s 12 tt t+s t+s
12
t+s tt  +  s - 1 t + s - 1 12t + s-1 tt t+s-1
 [       (  ;    ) +  ( 1  -    )     ( (   )  ] (1  +  )     y Ex x   
(1 +   )       [       (   ;  ) )  +  (1  -   )    (  ) ] y r Ex x
⎡⎤
=     
⎡ ⎤ λλ ρ µµ ψ αα
⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ψ λλ µµ αα ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦
             (10) 
  To progress towards estimating equations, we add specificity to the indirect utility functions  
by assuming that individuals are distinguished only by the liquidity constraint:  µ
1(x,y) = µ





2(x,y). Then, as shown in the Appendix, after taking the logarithm of (10) we 
can rewrite the first order conditions for g as             
12 1 2
tt t + s t t t         gt + s g gt  +  s  -  1 g
e
t+s t+s
l n   [      ( )     +       ( )   ]    l n   [      ( )     +       ( )   ]   yy EE xE E x
    =          +  D [ln  ] ,   r
γ− γ µµ µ µ
ρ− ψ
+ s - 1
                                                
                      (11) 
where we have used the approximation, ln(1+q) . q for q = {ρ, r}, D[ln ψt+s] = ln(ψt+s) - ln(ψt+s-1),  
 
12 Note from (9) that ψt+s+1 … ψt+s. Even when M(Etµ
2)/Mbt = 0 for type 2 voters (who are indifferent to the level of 
debt), type 1 voters remain liquidity constrained with M(Etµ
1)/Mbt…0. Government borrowing can then increase type 1 
utilities by loosening individual budget constraints and thereby generate additional support. Such action is costly in 
terms of support from type 2 voters, however, so that the liquidity constraints will not be completely eliminated. One 
may also note that in a model of the sort used by Hall (1978), µ
1 is absent and ψt+s = ψt+s-1 since there are no 










and where γ = [Nt λα1 /(Nt λα1 + Nt (1-λ)α2], assumed constant, is the relative political weight of type  
1, liquidity constrained voters in the political process.  
  Further progress can be made by linearizing (11) about its long run path ĝ = g
 (x t+s, xt+s-1, 
yt+s= 0, yt+s-1 = 0, ..) defined as government spending that would occur (given x) if all expected 
deviations from the long run path of the economy (the expected y's) were equal to zero. This is a 
natural choice as Keynesian stabilization emphasizes responses to expected shorter run or transitory 
economic developments. To more clearly distinguish between the role of liquidity constraints and 
longer run factors, the permanent component of g and the other policy variables will be defined to 
include the effects of wars.
13
  Because our results concern government plans, we now add back the superscript "e" to the 
policy instruments and to both the long run factors and transitory developments on which such plans 
are based. Then, when the left side of (11) is linearized around ĝ and the result is equated to the right 
side of (11) and rearranged, the following appealing estimating equations emerge (as shown in the 
Appendix):  
∆gt+s = ∆g ˆ t+s  +  [γ1 + γ2 (r
e
t+s) + γ3 (∆y
e
t+s) + γ4 (∆x
e
t+s)] +  ε
g
t+s                               (12) 
∆tt+s  =  ∆t ˆ t+s  +  [τ1 +τ2 (r
e
t+s)  + τ3 (∆y
e




t+s                               (13) 
  ∆(∆bt+s B rt+s bt+s-1)  =  ∆(∆b ˆ
t+s  B r
e
t+s b ˆ
t+s-1) + [β1 + β2 (r
e
t+s) + β3 (∆y
e
t+s) + β4 (∆x
e
t+s)]  + ε
b
t+s     (14) 
 
Here a 'hat' denotes a permanent or long run value while the terms in square brackets constitute the 
transitory or shorter run components of policy changes.
14 ∆(∆bt+s - rt+s bt+s-1) is the change in the real 
per capita deficit (net of interest paid to the private sector) and the ε's are error terms that reflect the  
mistakes made by governments in forecasting relevant information that in turn lead to deviations of  
                                                 
13 Our long run components of policy thus differ from those of Barro (1986) where the permanent components are 
defined to exclude war. 
14  The transitory parts of the equations are more specific about adjustment around the long run path than is, for 
example, an error correction model. The specificity arises here because of the structure implied by the political 










planned and actual changes in policy instruments. As an implication of the government budget  
constraint in (1a), βi = (γi - τi) for all i. Finally ε
g
t+s =  (∆gt+s - ∆g
e
t+s) is the difference between the 




t+s are  







  Note that the errors may be correlated over time if aggregate shocks are, but should be  
stationary since we are modelling an equilibrium system. The errors will also be uncorrelated with all  
explanatory variables if the forecasting of the government is rational in the sense that no information 
available at time t+s-1 could be used to improve forecasts of activity in the next period.   
  A detailed derivation of the estimating equations is provided in the Appendix. Here we 
explain the equations intuitively by first noting that the first differences in the variables appear 
because the linearization of (11) and its counterparts for taxation and the net deficit begins with the 
log of the ratio of first order conditions (i.e., the Euler Equation). The ∆y
e
t+s terms in the transitory 
part in square brackets reflect directly the political concern with the interests of liquidity constrained 
voters, while the terms in ∆x
e
t+s arise as a result of the trade-offs that must be made between the 
interests of these voters and those who are not liquidity constrained. The interest rate, relative to 
voters' common rate of time preference (present in the equations’ constant terms), reflects the 
intertemporal nature of the optimizing decisions undertaken by the political parties. 
  The nature of the transitory components in equations (12)-(14) can be better understood by  
considering the reasons why ∆g
e may differ from its long run value. This discussion also leads to 
predictions about the signs of the coefficients of the transitory part of the equations, which are 
derived formally in the Appendix (after further linearization):  
•  The first reason for ∆g
e to depart from ∆  is a pure liquidity effect. This appears as the third 
term in the square brackets in (12) and incorporates reactions to expected transitory changes. Be-
cause an expected increase in transitory income diminishes the scale of the liquidity constraint, it 





t+s in (12) is expected to be negative. Correspondingly, we expect τ3 > 0, and 










•  The second reason arises because current spending will also adjust to changes in the permanent  
variables and this effect is the fourth term in square brackets. Because the government responds 
to the intertemporal wishes of voters, expected increases in x lead individuals to want additional 
consumption and to have it spread smoothly over time. Assuming reasonably that  (My/Mgt+s)
e > 0, 
such actions reduce the magnitude of liquidity problems as a by-product and thus moderate the 
need for spending to deal with shorter run problems. The coefficient γ4  on ∆x
e
t+s in (12) should 
therefore be negative. For similar reasons we expect τ4 > 0 and β4 < 0. 
 
•  The third reason for ∆g
e to depart from ∆  is when r g ˆ t+s changes relative to voters' rate of time 
preference, ρ. For example, if the interest rate falls relative to ρ, individuals prefer more of their 
consumption earlier. The resulting increase in government spending reduces the need for current 
spending to deal with liquidity problems. For this reason we expect the coefficient γ2 on rt+s in 
(12) to be positive, and, for similar reasons τ2 < 0 and  β2 > 0. Note, however, that the coefficient 
on the interest rate will also pick up the short run effects on the net deficit of changes in the cost 
of carrying existing debt, so we must remain agnostic about the sign of rt+s. 
 
4.1  Testing for Keynes 
  The model outlined above predicts political policy responses to the demands of liquidity and 
non-liquidity constrained voters. The question now arises: what exactly is Keynesianism in this 
framework and how would the strength of Keynesianism in public policy be assessed?  Because 
competitive political parties will not undertake a new direction in policy unless that innovation has 
popular support, we must address the way in which individuals believe that Keynesian policy can 
improve their welfare. 
  One way that textbook Keynesian as illustrated in Figure 1 could arise is through the en-
hanced appreciation by individual voters of the role government can play as an agent for internalising 
the externalities inherent in liquidity constraints. In this sense Keynesianism follows Leijonhufvud’s 
(1968) interpretation of Keynes. Greater recognition of both the feasibility and desirability of using 
government to increase expected utility when y
e falls (i.e., when liquidity constraints become more 
binding) increases the political benefit of using fiscal policies and so leads government spending 
(taxes, and the deficit) to temporarily depart further from its equilibrium path. This interpretation 
implies that the coefficient on ∆y
e
t+s, which directly reflects the political benefit of accommodating  
liquidity constrained voters,










15  Thus with γ3 < 0 in (12) and τ3 > 0 in (13), both the negative correlation between  
(∆gt - ∆g ˆ t) and ∆y
e
t+s and the positive correlation of (∆tt - ∆t ˆ t) and ∆y
e
t+s will be stronger. Corre-
spondingly, the implied negative correlation for the deficit will also be larger. 
   A test for Keynesianism in the above sense can now be implemented as follows. Consider the 
differential policy process Dg defined as  
Dg  =  [(∆g - ∆ ) 'after Keynes' ] ! [(∆g - ∆g) in the counterfactual],                 (15)  g ˆ ˆ
where the counterfactual is a prediction of what ex ante transitory policy for the period after World 
War II would have been if the data generating process governing pre-Keynesian policy had continued 
to apply. (Dg is then the first difference of the policy differential shown in Figure 1). Similar policy 
differentials for taxation, Dt, and for the net deficit, D∆b, can also be defined. Then if an increase in y
e 
loosens the liquidity constraint and so generates welfare for liquidity constrained voters, our model 
implies that Dg will be negatively correlated with ∆y
e if textbook Keynesianism has been attempted. 
And such a countercyclical pattern for Dg would be revealed by a negative coefficient on ∆y
e  in a 
regression explaining Dg (outlined below). Exactly the opposite, or pro-cyclical pattern of Dt with 
respect to ∆y
e, would be observed for taxes. Finally, because Dg moves counter-cyclically and Dt 
pro-cyclically, D∆b will move counter-cyclically like spending since ∆b-rb-1 = ∆g - ∆t, D∆b = Dg - Dt. 
We note for later use that y
e is sometimes measured as the deviation of the unemployment rate from 
its trend. In this case a positive expected deviation will tighten the liquidity constraint and reverse the  
predicted coefficient signs in the policy differential regressions.  
  Finally, notice that by construction, our policy differentials will capture all political responses  
                                                 
15 The Appendix demonstrates (with some further linearization) that a rise in the expected marginal utility Eµ
1
g from 
public spending will increase the absolute value of the coefficients on ∆y
e
t+s  in (12)-(14).  A rise in the expected 
utility generated by government action, however, must be distinguished from an increase in the effectiveness of 
fiscal intervention, i.e., a rise in My/Mgt+s. As shown in the Appendix, such a productivity shock reduces intervention. 
Because the channelling of resources to type 1 voters reduces the support from type 2 voters, the government can 
increase overall support by easing back on its intervention. In assessing this argument, it should be recalled that 
voters demand welfare, not intervention per se. Thus, by analogy, when the marginal cost of  'light' (or changes in 
welfare) falls because 'light bulbs' (fiscal interventions) now 'burn' twice as long, more hours of 'light' are demanded 
but fewer 'light bulbs' are used, assuming demand for 'light' is downward sloping.  Finally, for completeness, we 









to changes in aggregate activity for motives that may have nothing to do with stabilization. They do  
not explicitly allow for events like the growing importance of income taxation or the expansion of 
the welfare state following 1945 that may be unrelated to Keynesian ideas, and which may have 
affected the sensitivity of the fiscal system to transitory shocks. We allow for these possibilities 
explicitly in the empirical work, in a manner to be discussed below. 
 
5.   Estimation 
  Before implementing the model of planned fiscal policies and the associated test for Keyne-
sianism, it is of interest to look at the history of the fiscal system that we are exploring. 
[Figure 2 here] 
At first glance, Figure 2 suggests that the volatility of the fiscal system of the Government of Canada 
was greater after World War II than before. But this may be an illusion as far as g and t are con-
cerned. The coefficients of variation given in the table below the figure for the 1871-1913, interwar 
and 1950-2000 periods indicate that public spending and taxation are about as volatile after the 
second war as they were before the first.
16 On the other hand, the volatility of the net deficit is about 
7 times larger after 1950 as before 1914. Since the volatility of real income per capita growth after 
1950 is less than half of what it was prior to WW I, it is tempting to conclude on this evidence that 
Keynesianism via deficit financing played a role in stabilizing the real economy. Whether or not the 
methodology outlined above confirms that such stabilization was attempted remains to be seen.  
5.1  Four steps 
  It is convenient to summarize the empirical implementation of our framework in four steps. 
Step One: Specify a long run model of fiscal policy and construct estimates of both permanent 
income x
e and of the expected transitory shocks y
e.  
 
  The two parts of step 1 are closely related and are completed together. To begin, the political  
                                                 
16 It should  keep in mind that although different time series have similar coefficients of variation over a long period 









parties form their estimates of the longer run components of fiscal structure as well as of x
e and y
e 
using the same information set in each case (although the weights placed on the members of this set 
may vary with the variable being forecast). A useful way to choose what should be included in the 
information set is by considering the determinants of the long run size of government and its financ-
ing, since the literature on this topic is well-established. The statistical properties of the variables 
identified can then be considered and a model of long run income estimated and then used to con-
struct forecasts of expected transitory changes. It should again be noted that the latter are not sur-
prises, but ex ante guesses at forthcoming shorter run developments.  
  The long run fiscal system is not estimated at this point. Rather we combine the estimation of 
the permanent and transitory elements of fiscal structure together in the next step. Before doing so, 
however, we will discuss the expected signs of the coefficients in a long run model of fiscal structure 
as this will be useful in assessing the results from the full model that are presented later.  
  Perhaps the most prominent hypothesis associated with permanent government size is 
Wagner’s Law: that increasing social complexity results in an income elasticity of government 
spending that is greater than one. Following Mueller (2003,509), we incorporate Wagner's Law by 
including both the forecasted change in real income per capita x
e and urbanization as determinants of 
government size and financing. Because urbanization itself is unavailable for our full time period, we 
utilize its mirror image - the percentage of the population in agriculture (AGRIC). A negative sign on 
the coefficient of AGRIC is then expected in the long run part of the full model of government. We 
return to the role of income below. 
  Population size (POP) often appears as a test of the ‘publicness’ of government services. If  
there is ‘publicness’ in government services, a larger population can be provided for with less than a  
proportionate expansion in expenditure, suggesting a positive coefficient with elasticity less than one. 
On the tax side, however, publicness means that a larger population lowers the marginal tax price of 









The immigration to population ratio (IMMRATIO) is another demographic characteristic that may 
shape long run government size and financing in a country like Canada where immigration flows 
have been substantial, especially before the First World War. The sign here cannot be predicted for 
the same reasons as with POP.  
  Many studies of the long run size of government also find that the age structure, as measured 
by the proportion of the population that is old, has a positive effect on government size.  Here we 
have available from 1870 only the proportion of the population that is less than 17 years old 
(%YOUNG) which is expected to behave in the opposite direction. In addition, age structure may 
influence the choice between debt and current taxation (see, for example, Cukierman and Meltzer 
1989), with older populations preferring more debt for future generations and less current taxation, 
though such self-interest will be tempered by concern with one's children. We expect  %YOUNG  to 
be associated with less spending and debt and with more taxation. 
  Another variable that has come into some prominence in studies of government size is the 
degree to which an economy is exposed to foreign shocks. Greater openness, measured by the sum of 
exports and imports relative to GDP (OPEN), is believed to result in a larger size of government as a 
form of insurance (see Rodrik 1998). On the other hand, openness may enforce fiscal discipline in 
order to maintain international competitiveness (Borcherding, Ferris and Garzoni, 2003), leading 
perhaps to the opposite sign in the long run part of the spending equation.  
  We also include a set of dummy variables to incorporate the permanent influence of three 
important external shocks in our time period: World War I (WWI), World War II (WWII) and the oil  
shock of the mid 1970's (OILPERM, = 1 from 1974 on). We also include dummies WWI-aftermath  
(= 1 for 1919-22) and WWII-aftermath (=1 for 1946-49) to allow for the rapid restoration of a  
peacetime economy. 
  Finally, in forecasting both the long run size of government and permanent income, Canadian  









we model using U.S. real consumption per capita (USCON).  Consumption is used on the grounds 
that it is more closely related to permanent income than is current income.  
  The variables identified so far are listed in Table 1b, where the long run model for real 
income per capita is specified. We will use the same set of explanatory variables given in the table to 
model the permanent components of fiscal structure - that is, including USCON but excluding 
Canadian real income. It will become clear shortly why we find it useful to substitute Canadian 
income out of the model for long run fiscal structure using its reduced form forecasting equation.   
  The statistical properties of the logs of the variables we have identified are given in Table 
1a.
17 In terms of their time series properties, almost all variables are integrated of order 1, becoming 
stationary only after first differencing. The exception is log (POP), in the second last column, which 
is I(2). Although such time series properties would suggest that a model in first differences is re-
quired, a long run model for x in the levels of the log-transformed variables will be appropriate if the 
residuals of those regressions are stationary. Again population is an exception and must be first 
differenced to be present in the equation. The cointegrating regression in levels is presented in Table 
1b, for the entire time period 1871-2000.
18 As well, Table 1b presents the model estimated over the 
two individual subperiods - before and after WWII. This allows for a structural shift in the relation-
ship (whose presence is confirmed by the reported F test). Tests of the equation residuals indicate 
stationarity in all three cases
19,20. The unlogged, forecasted values from these regressions then form  
the basis for our estimates of x
e and y
e. An unconstrained distributed lag on the forecast (of real per  
capita income x) from the model in Table 1b, using a current value and two lags, is used to represent  
                                                 
17 The log of the net deficit does not appear here because the net deficit is often negative. 
18 Table 1b also presents the equation for the whole period estimated via Saikkonen's (1991) method . However, the 
original cointegrating regressions in cols 2, 4 and 5 are used in subsequent steps as the basis for forecasts.  
19 Cointegration, as judged by stationarity of the residuals, is not inconsistent with the structural shift implied by the 
use of dummy variables if some of the right side variables also undergo the shifts needed to maintain cointegration.    
20 It appears that g and t can also be described as stationary in levels with a shift in the constant and slope. Following 
Perron (1997, 358, model 2) in using the minimization of the t-statistic for the test of the null that the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable is equal to one, the shift appears to occur sometime during WWII. This provides some 









expected long run income, x
e. A distributed lag on calculated transitory income y = x ! x
e, again 
using the current and two lagged values, is used to model expected transitory developments y
e on 
which policy-makers act in formulating their stabilization and other policies. Similarly in what 
follows, r
e is proxied using a distributed lag on real interest rates r. 
Step two: Estimate the full model (12) - (14) as a system over two periods, one 'before Keynes' 
(1875-1938) and one 'after Keynes' (1950 - 2000).  Use the results to estimate the ex ante transitory 
or shorter run components of fiscal structure.  
 
  After the estimates of expected activity have been formed, the full model containing both 
permanent and transitory components can be estimated over the two periods, one 'before' and one 
'after' Keynes.  The transitory components can then be extracted. The estimated model of these 
components in the first (1875-1938) period is then used in the next step to construct the counterfac-
tual. Our analytical framework indicates that these (Euler) equations should be in first difference 
form.  
  Perhaps because of the common pattern of growth throughout our long time period, the levels 
of the fiscal variables, g, t, (∆b B r b-1), together with the explanatory variables identified in step one 
are integrated of order one, over the whole sample as well as for shorter sub samples (before and 
after WWII).  The exceptions are POP and USCON which are I(2). Here then we utilize the fact that 
both the fiscal structure and our explanatory variables become stationary only in first differences to 
estimate the model of the permanent parts of fiscal structure in first difference form, with the two I(2) 
variables on the right side allowing the error term in the equations to remain stationary. This then fits 
nicely with our model of the transitory components, which is also specified in first difference form.  
  One approach to estimating equations (12) - (14) is to use the forecasts from a separately  
estimated long run model for fiscal structure (discussed above) to measure the permanent compo- 
nents of policy, and then estimate the transitory parts using the differences [∆gt+s−∆g ˆ t+s],  
[∆tt+s−∆ t

t+s], and [∆(∆bt+s−rt+sbt+s-1) − ∆(∆b ˆ
t+s − rt+sb ˆ
t+s-1)]. A better approach, in our view, is to 









avoiding the use of generated regressors. This should produce better estimates of the total effect on 
policy arising from each component and better equation statistics. We then extract the transitory 
components from this more comprehensive model to construct the policy differentials Dg, Dt and D∆b. 
To allow this extraction to proceed in a clean fashion, it is convenient that expected long run income 
x
e enter only the transitory part of the model. It was for this reason that we solved x
e out of the model 
of the long run components in step 1, as discussed earlier.
21, 22
  Table 2 presents three stage least squares estimates (3SLS) of the full model for 1875-1938 
and 1950-2000.
23  Here contemporaneous values of the real interest rate r and of the change in 
transitory income ∆y, are treated as endogenous, given our use of annual data, since they may depend 
to some extent on current policy choices, and the estimates of income used are those derived from 
estimation over the two periods given in Table 1b. Unconstrained distributed lags in the transitory 
parts allow for expectations formation by the government and for lags in policy implementation. We 
generally used the longest lag possible in each case, an approach that is tempered by degrees of 
freedom considerations.  
  Because the equations are the result of political optimizing by the same political party, they 
will all be symmetric on the right side. This structure is helpful. As long as the instruments used are 
the same across equations, the government budget restraints (1a) are automatically enforced and 
3SLS is equivalent to equation-by-equation application of two-stage least squares.  
 [Table 2 here] 
  We consider the variables in the transitory part of the model first, beginning with the signs on  
                                                 
21 In Ferris and Winer (2003) the first route was followed. There the forecast of the transitory part required that the 
long run effect of income be 'taken out' to get at the transitory part alone. 
22 Consideration of the role of the factors underlying the long run identified in step one is one useful check on the 
results of estimation. The sign restrictions for the (sum of ) coefficients of ∆y
e
  and ∆x
e in (12)!(14) stated earlier 
provide a further way of assessing the results. 
23 Time periods differ from those in Table 1b due to the use of lags. These equations are somewhat related to model 
5 in Pagan (1984). They differ in that the generated regressors on the right side are in first differences, and because 
∆y
e is a forecast of shorter run changes in activity and not a surprise. The two-step procedure - estimate ∆x
e and ∆y
e 
and then (12)-(14) - yields consistent estimates, but not full efficiency so that care must be taken in relying upon t-
statistics. In that respect, we note that our main interest is to use the equations to construct the 'before' and 'after 










e and on ∆x
e. These are as predicted for the 1950-2000 period, whether one considers significant  
coefficients or the sum of all coefficients. The signs on significant variables for the 1875-1938 period 
are of the opposite sign, indicating (as do the F-tests in the last row of the table) that the policy 
processes differ before and after the second war. It appears that governments before WWII did 
respond to expected short and longer run changes in aggregate activity, and did so pro-cyclically. 
Though if one judges by the absolute size of coefficients, the responsiveness was substantially less 
before1939 than after1950. An alternative interpretation of these results is that governments 'before 
Keynes' placed little weight on the interests of liquidity constrained voters while the coefficients on 
∆y
e and ∆x
e pick up short and long run responses to changes in the demand for government spending 
and its financing, rather than short run trade-offs between the interests of the two voter types. 
  The estimated long run components of the equations are shaded grey in Table 2. Generally 
the model of the longer run components works well. Here we see that urbanization, proxied by 
AGRIC, has its predicted negative effect in the early period when urbanization was most pronounced 
and has no significant effect after. In contrast, Mueller (2003 chapter 21) reports limited success in 
the literature as a whole with such a variable.  The proportion of young voters (%YOUNG) has its 
predicted negative sign in the second period, implying that spending and debt rise as the population 
ages, possibly as a result of the changes generated by the post-war baby boom and bust. As the 
population ages in the early sample period, only taxation responds significantly, rising as the popula-
tion ages. (The sign for taxation in the later period is also positive, but it is insignificant). OPEN has 
a positive effect on spending before WWII - financed by a combination of taxation and debt - but 
after 1950 this effect is reversed, indicating that the forces of international competition may then be  
dominating the demands for social insurance. 
  The coefficients on POP suggest that evidence of economies of scale in public services is  









even it is significant only for taxation.  Moreover, coefficients on IMMRATIO are only negative (but 
insignificant) for debt in the second period, and are positive and significant for spending (in the early  
period) and for taxation (in both periods).  
  Finally, we note that the estimates indicate that after WWI, the post-war readjustment of 
spending and taxation was insufficient to offset wartime increases, implying the existence of a 
Peacock-Wiseman (1961) displacement effect after 1918. Dudley and Witt (2002) recently find a 
similar result concerning the First World War for a sample of western countries. We also see that the 
OPEC shock and its aftermath led to a contraction in the long run size of government.  
Step three: Use the transitory part of each estimated equation in Table 2 'before Keynes' to forecast 
into the period 'after' in order to construct the counterfactual. Then compute changes in policy 
differentials, Dg, Dt ,and DÎb which compare the counterfactual with the best 'after Keynes' model of 
transitory fiscal plans. 
 
  The resulting changes in the policy differentials, Dg, Dt and D∆b = Dg - Dt , based on the 
estimates in Table 2 are graphed in Figure 3. Inspection of this interesting figure suggests the absence 
of trends and a shift about 1980 in the volatility of the differentials.
24 (The shift is confirmed statisti-
cally below). The figure also hints at the existence of Keynesian stabilization. The serious Canadian 
recessions of 1981/82 and of 1990/91 appear to be coincident with rapidly rising expenditure and 
debt and declining taxation relative to the counterfactual. We also see a similar but less pronounced 
pattern during the period of high unemployment (at least for the time) between 1957 and 1960.
25 On 
the other hand, in the four years following the OPEC oil embargo when unemployment rose continu-
ally, Dg was declining and Dt rising. 
[Figure 3 here] 
Step 4: Regress Dg,, Dt, and DÎb on the transitory shocks to which the government may have re-
sponded in formulating stabilization policies, making due allowance for the possibly unrelated (to 
Keynesianism) rise of the welfare state after World War Two.  
                                                 
24  The policy differentials are stationary at least at 5% using a univariate ADF test with a constant and with a trend 
for the debt differential.  
25 It is interesting to note that in 1961 the Governor of the Bank of Canada resigned, in large measure because he did 
not agree with the government's avowed Keynesian policy stance. Scott Gordon, who is quoted in the Introduction, 










  The final step formally tests for the presence of Keynesian elements in ex ante shorter run or  
transitory policy. Here we regress the calculated policy differentials on expected changes in transi-
tory activity and variables that control for the greater cyclical sensitivity of the fiscal system due to 
the rise of the welfare state. Unconstrained lags in these variables allow for expectations formation 
and for decision and bureaucratic delays, leading to a sample that extends from 1952 to 2000. 
Preliminary exploration using sequential Chow tests on the ordinary least square versions of these 
equations, as well as the prior inspection of Figure 3, suggests allowing for shifts in the constant and 
in the slopes of the regressions.
26  
  Given the importance attached to unemployment in public debate, we use unemployment  
rates to represent the expected transitory activity to which stabilization policy (if it exists) is tai-
lored.
27 Specifically, we define )y
e
u as the difference between the change in the current unemploy-
ment rate and the lagged value of the equally weighted, four year moving average of such changes.
 
Unlike transitory income, a positive value for )y
e
u  now represents a tightening of liquidity con-
straints. Thus a (significantly) positive sign on the sum of lags of )yu  in the policy differential 
equation for spending implies that spending expands when the change in unemployment is expected  
to be 'high'. Together with a negative sign for taxation, and/or a positive sign in the deficit equation,  
this coefficient pattern would imply that planned transitory policy 'after Keynes' exhibits textbook 
Keynesian stabilization relative to the counterfactual.  
  To control for the growing influence of income taxation and the welfare system on the  
cyclicality of fiscal instruments, we employ an additional variable and its lag in the regressions: 
D(autoT) = [the lagged value of the four year moving average of  the ratio of personal income tax 
                                                 
26 It may also be noted that Hansen (1992) stability tests on the OLS versions of the policy differential regressions 
which exclude the shift in constant and slopes sometimes indicates instability of some coefficients. The instability 
largely disappears when the shifts in 1980 are incorporated. 
27 The unemployment rate cannot be used at prior stages since it is available only from 1919, while estimation 
begins with data for 1870. In assessing statistical significance in the regressions in Table 3, it should be noted that 
that )y
e









revenue to total tax revenue] times [the contemporaneous change in real income per capita]. By 
construction, this variable directly reflects the growing importance of the income tax after the war. In 
addition it is made to depend on total income rather than on a deviation from some trend, since taxes 
respond to the total change. D(autoT) is highly correlated with a second variable that we considered 
for structural change on the expenditure side - the moving average ratio of personal transfer pay-
ments to total government spending times the change in the unemployment rate.  Hence D(autoT) 
can be used to reflect the sensitivity of fiscal policy to economic fluctuations on both sides of the 
budget.
28, 29  
  It is important to note that D(autoT) is not a measure of the automatic part of fiscal policy in 
the traditional sense. It controls for the influence of the welfare system on cyclical sensitivity of the 
budget, when the welfare system is assumed to be unrelated to Keynesianism. What matters in the 
present context is whether or not the welfare state (or the income tax) evolved as part of a broader 
Keynesian enterprise of the sort discussed, for example, by Hall (1989). Since it can be argued that 
Keynesian thinking made it easier to adopt cyclically sensitive fiscal institutions after 1945, we also 
present the policy differential equations without D(autoT) in panel two of Table 3. These shorter 
equations then embody a test for Keynes when it is assumed that the design of the welfare state was 
fully part of Keynesianism. A reasonable guess is that the truth about Keynesianism lies somewhere 
in between the two sets of results.  
  We also estimate the policy differential equations using only the estimated ex ante transitory  
components of fiscal structure 'after Keynes', and then only with the 'before Keynes' components 
from Table 2 as the dependent variables. These regressions are presented in panels three and four of 
                                                 
28 Over 1950-2000, D(autoT) and its analogue for transfers to persons -  D(autoG) = (the lagged four year moving 
average of the ratio of transfers to persons to non-interest spending) times (the contemporaneous change in the 
unemployment rate) - has a correlation of -0.71. The correlation of D(autoG) with the measure of transitory activity  
)y
e
ut is 0.88, while the correlation of D(autoT) with  )y
e
ut  is -0.61. Hence to reduce the problem of collinearity in 





u , D(autoT) is not interacted with a shift in 1980 since by design it allows for changes in the structure 










Table 3 respectively. Comparison of these regressions with those in panel one shows how the use of 
the counterfactual affects our conclusions, and illustrates the differences between the nature of ex 
ante policy before and after the second war.    
  Finally, we use two lags on )yu and one on D(autoT) in the policy differentials. Further lags 
lead to degrees of freedom problems. The current values of )yu and of D(autoT) are instrumented to 
allow for simultaneity with contemporaneous fiscal policies and, to preserve the adding up of the 
policy differentials due to the government budget restraint, all variables are entered into each equa-
tion using the same instruments in each case.  
  With this background, we turn to the results of the three-stage estimation of the policy 
differential equations (again equivalent to 2SLS in this symmetric case) over the 1952-2000 period. 
Our discussion of the results in Table 3 is based initially on consideration of the coefficients on )y
e
u 
and its lags. We consider the quantitative importance or size of any Keynesian policy implied by the 
point estimates later. 
[Table 3 here] 
  Panel one of Table 3 presents the policy differential regressions when the regressions control 
for the (assumed) unrelated role of the welfare state. Judging by the sum of significant coefficients on 
the current and lagged )yu reported in the shaded column, we find textbook Keynesianism in all 
policy instruments on average over the period after 1952 as a whole. On average, spending and the  
net deficit rose and  taxes fell relative to the counterfactual when )y
e
u was positive.  
  Panel one also shows that policy was less Keynesian in nature before1980, as taxation and 
the deficit, but not spending, are procyclical if we consider only significant coefficients in the early 
period. This aspect of the results in panel one are reminiscent of the Canadian automatic 









on pre-1980 data omits responses to the major recessions of the post-1945 period.
30  
  Panel two of the table presents the policy differential regressions when D(autoT) is dropped  
from the regressions, so that the welfare state is now viewed as fully part of the Keynesian revolu-
tion. Here we see that attempts at stabilization are much more strongly evident in the data. Judging 
again by the sum of significant coefficients, the results in panel two exceed by a factor of three the 
results in panel one for the case of taxation (reflecting the income sensitivity of taxation), and by two 
times for the case of the deficit.
31
  Panel three of Table 3 presents results when the need for a counterfactual is ignored, and only 
the ex ante transitory components of policy 'after Keynes' are used as dependent variables. These 
results also look traditionally Keynesian, though less so than when the counterfactual is incorporated. 
For both spending and the deficit, the difference in results between panels one and three amounts to 
about 18-20 per cent of the amount in panel one, and about 7 percent for taxation. Finally, we note 
that the sums of significant coefficients in panel four suggest that if the 'before Keynes' regime was 
in place after 1952, policy would have been on balance mildly procyclical and thus would have been 
much more 'conservative' than ex ante policy actually was. This difference in the nature of fiscal 
policy before and after Keynes is a reflection of the statistically significant differences in regimes 
uncovered previously in Table 2.  
5.3  Significance versus importance and further sensitivity 
  Statistical significance one thing and economic importance is another. It is possible that 
Keynesian stabilization was implemented but in magnitudes that were, for all practical purposes, 
irrelevant. In our results, however, the magnitudes involved appear to be substantive. To consider the 
matter, we use the policy differential regressions to calculate the effect on ex ante policy of a one 
                                                 
30 Concerning panel one, it is interesting to note as well that the constant terms document a longer run shift in policy 
after 1980, involving less spending, less debt, and more taxation, on average, despite the pronounced role given to 
stabilization. 
31  Comparison of panels one and two confirms that D(autoT) in panel one does capture the effect of the cyclical 









standard deviation change in the expected transitory part of unemployment. (This standard deviation 
is 1.52 percentage points, as shown in Table 4b.) The results of applying this change to the models in 
panels one and two of Table 3 are shown in the first two columns of Table 4a.  
  Using panel one, where the welfare state is assumed entirely unrelated to Keynesianism, a  
one standard deviation increase in )y
e
u results in a change in the deficit of between $183 per capita  
and $222 per capita, depending on whether only significant coefficients or all coefficients are used. 
This is an amount that is about equal to one standard deviation in the estimated transitory part of 
income y (= actual income less estimated income x from Table 1b) over the 1952-2000 period 
recorded in Table 4b. The changes in g and t are about half as big, but still substantial. Measures of 
the responsiveness of fiscal structure that fully include the welfare state as part of Keynesianism are 
even larger.  In the case of the deficit, the change from $367 to $428 is about 1.75 to two times the 
standard deviation change in transitory income. Taxation responds by about three times as much  
(-$239 versus -$89) as when the welfare state is excluded in panel one. 
   Finally, as a check on our results, we redid all four major steps using estimates of permanent 
and transitory income based on the whole period from 1871 to 2000, instead of estimating separately 
over two samples, before and after WWII. This produces forecasts of income with a bigger variance, 
as shown in Table 4b, and is, in our view, a less desirable procedure given the possibility of structural 
change over the more than 130 years that we study. The resulting quantitative estimates of fiscal 
changes following a standard deviation change in unemployment are given in Table 4a. Considering 
the results using all coefficients in column four, we see that the deficit changes by about 10% 
(90/887) of a standard deviation in the corresponding transitory income given in Table 4b. This rises 
to about 22% (198/887) when the welfare state is included as part of Keynesian policy. These results 
illustrate that it matters how one chooses to model both the long run evolution of the economy as 










6.  Conclusion  
 While  the  General Theory has undoubtedly influenced how economists, politicians and 
voters think about intervention, whether policy has actually changed in response to the introduction 
of Keynesian ideas is another matter. In this paper, we consider the procedures needed to search 
meaningfully for evidence of systematic attempts at Keynesian fiscal stabilization. In essence, the 
task requires, first, the construction of a counterfactual that illustrates what planned policy would 
have been 'after Keynes' had Keynesian stabilization not been attempted and, second, the separation 
of ex ante policy choices in political equilibrium into permanent and transitory components. Finally, 
all of this must be developed within a framework where there is a reason why Keynesian stabilization 
might generate political support from some voters. While the investigation requires a number of 
difficult conceptual choices at various points, the methodology we have developed for studying the 
evolution of the public finances over long periods of time leads to interesting insights into Canadian 
fiscal history, and could be applied to study the fiscal history of other countries as well.  
  Budgets in a democratic state are always the result of extensive political dealing. They 
embody implicit contracts that, because of negotiation costs, are costly to vary quickly through time.  
For such reasons, it would not be surprising to find that the degree of stabilization that actually 
occurs over the business cycle is small. In this regard, then, it is both interesting and significant that 
our analysis has found that, relative to a counterfactual and even assuming the welfare state is 
unrelated, Keynes' ideas can be judged to have had a substantial, systematic effect on shorter run 
fiscal policy choices, especially over the last two decades or so in Canada. Judging the extent to 
which these attempts at stabilization have been successful or are appropriate in the circumstances are 
other matters that remain outstanding problems for political economy. We hope that our analysis will 
be helpful in allowing further progress on these issues, as well as on others where a positive model of 
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Planned Fiscal Policy 'Before' and 'After' Keynes 
 
































1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
real non interest spending per capita
real taxation per capita
real deficit net of interest payments per capita
Fiscal Structure, Government of Canada, 1870-2000
 
 





    mean            coef of var 
1920-1938 
    mean          coef of  var 
1950-2000 
    mean            coef of var 
growth of real income per capita  ( @ x        / x )   0.022            2.35 0.006 13.97 0.024 1.02
real non-interest spending per capita (g)  130.61            0.38 263.66 0.26 2407.79 0.35
real tax revenue per capita (t)  142.27            0.35 339.06 0.11 2376.86 0.35
real deficit net of interest payments per capita (ªb!rb-1)  -11.66            -1.75 -75.40 -0.97 30.07 12.18
     * Notes: coef of var = coefficient of variation. Figures may not add due to rounding.  
 
 
Table 1a: Some Descriptive Statistics, 1870 - 2000 
 
  Log(g) Log(t)  Log(x)  Log(AGRIC) Log(OPEN) Log(IMMRATIO) Log(%YOUNG)  Log(POP) Log(USCON)
Mean  -2.362 6.33 8.668  -1.635  -0.830  -4.90  3.59  9.29  8.48 
Std. Dev.  0.625 1.29  0.809  1.02  0.219  0.880  0.191  0.670  0.730 
ADF (4 lags)  
levels  -1.766 -0.545 0.144  1.65  -0.739  -2.88  -0.186  0.641  0.100 
ADF (4 lags)  
1
st dif  -6.69* -4.68*  -5.95*  -3.11**  -5.13*  -5.90*  -2.56 
-3.78*(6 lags)  -2.50 -4.96* 




             -7.00*   
Notes:   * (**) = significant at 1% (10%) per cent with constant and no trend (MacKinnon, 1996). Critical value at 0.10 = - 2.58   
with n = 130.  g = real non-interest public expenditure per capita, t = real taxation per capita, x= real income (GNP) per capita.  
   
 
Table 1b: Long Run Real Per Capita Income, Canada, Various Periods 
(OLS Estimation.  t-statistics in brackets) 
 
Dependent variable: 
log (real income per cap) 
1871-2000 
with  Newey-West t's 
1873-1998 with 
Saikkonen t's 
(b)  1871-1938 1947-2000 
log (AGRIC)  -0.20 (-4.23*)  -0.22 (4.62)  -1.66  -0.37  
log(IMMRATIO)  0.06 (2.72*)  0.07 (3.29)  0.12  -0.01  
log(%YOUNG)  0.26 (1.37)  0.11 (0.56)  -1.49   -0.11  
log(OPEN)  0.05 (0.67)  -0.01 (-0.14)  0.19   0.07  
D[log(POP)]  2.53 (2.18*)  4.92 (2.90)  -2.48   -0.01 
log (USCON)  0.32 (1.36)  0.03 (0.14)  -0.19   0.67 
WWI  0.15 (3.50*)  0.24 (4.71)  0.10   
WWI aftermath (1919-21)  -0.06 (-2.47*)  -0.05 (-1.24)  -0.06   
WWII  0.26 (4.28*)  0.25 (6.46)     
WWII aftermath (1946-49)  0.06 (2.00*)  0.06 (1.31)    -0.04 
OILPERM (1974  on)  0.07 (1.21)  0.08 (1.39)    0.05  
Trend  0.01 (2.87*)  0.02 (4.48)  -0.0004  -0.01 










-5.12 (1 lag) 




-5.87 (1 lag) 




-4.00 (1 lag) 




-5.21 (1 lag) 
  -4.56 (2 lags) 
P-value for shift      0.00 
Notes :   * (**) = significant at 5% (10%). D = indicates a first difference. R
2 is unadjusted. DW = Durbin-Watson. (a) ADF for 6 
variables (excluding dummies and logUSCON), without constant or trend, using indicated lags of first difference terms. MacKinnon 
(1996) critical value with n=130 at 0.10  = - 4.53; at 0.05 = 4.51. Critical value with 4 variables (e.g., excluding also %YOUNG and 
POP) at 0.10 = -3.48; at 0.05 = -3.78.  
(b) t-statistics in col. 2 may not be correct if right side variables are correlated with the error term in the cointegrating regressions, 
and are not reported for cols 4 - 5.  Col. 3 reports t-statistics adjusted by the Saikkonen (1991) method to allow for this correlation. 
One lead and lag (two produce similar results) of the first six explanatory variables is used  (not reported), along with 5 lags in the  
autoregressive model of the error from which the estimate of the long run standard error is derived (see Enders 2004, p 380).   
P-value for shift = P-value for F test of null that equations as a whole are not different across time.  
Variable definitions: see Appendix.    
 
Table 2: Transitory and Permanent Components of Fiscal Structure: Government of Canada, 1875-1938 and 1950-2000  
 (3SLS Estimation) 
 
Variables 
 (expected signs) 
 
Lag  Non-interest 



















Net Deficit       ª[ªb-
rb-1] 
1875-1938 
Net  Deficit  
ª[ªb-rb-1] 
1950-2000 
0  7.10 (5.49*)  -6.31 (-0.44)  0.20 (0.40)  28.86 (2.40*)  6.90 (4.59*)  -35.16 (-2.22*) 
1  -0.39 (-0.43)  -13.07 (-1.30)  -0.68 (-1.91**)  -0.98 (-0.12)  0.29 (0.27)  -12.09 (-1.08) 
 
r
e  ( + ) 
a
 




e ( - ) 




e  ( + ) 
  -0.83 (-0.77)  5.86 (0.82) 
0  0.05 (1.11)  -0.24 (-2.02*)  .02 (1.49)  0.24 (2.42*)  0.02 (0.45)  -0.48 (-3.66*) 
1  0.10 (2.59*)  -0.11 (-1.10)  -.004 (-.31)  -.06 (-0.68)  0.10 (2.33*)  -0.05 (-0.49) 
 
∆ y
e   ( - ) 
b  
2  0.03 (1.14)  -0.26 (-2.64*) 
 
∆ y
e  ( + ) 
-.001 (-1.10)  0.15 (1.78**) 
 
∆ y
e   ( - )  
0.04 (1.35)  -0.40 (-3.74*) 
0  -0.18 (-0.59)  -0.06 (-0.39)  0.01 (1.06)  0.39 (2.89*)  -0.03 (-0.87)  -0.46 (-2.54*) 
1  0.03 (1.37)  0.0009 (0.01)  -0.17 (-1.68*)  0.005 (0.08)  0.05 (1.74**)  -.004 (-.05) 
 
∆ x
e  ( - ) 
c  
 




e  ( + ) 
  .01 (1.13)  0.11 (2.23*) 
∆ x
e  ( - ) 
0.03 (1.10)  -0.22 (-3.10*) 
D(AGRIC)    -2300.6 (-2.74*)  -1276.6 (-0.21)    -3.01 (-.009)  -5775.8 (-1.00)    -2297.6 (-2.35*)  4299.2 (0.56) 
D(IMRATIO)    1394.40 (1.88*)  -1602.9 (-0.16)    1005.7 (3.48*)  16042.0 (1.91*)    388.71 (0.45)  -17645 (-1.60) 
D(%YOUNG)    -28.05 (-0.77)  -135.38 (-2.66*)    -42.75 (-3.01*)  -44.58 (-1.04)    14.70 (0.35)  -90.80 (-1.61**) 
D(OPEN)    622.70 (3.82*)  -1573.7 (-1.61**)    203.07 (3.20*)  -406.94 (-0.50)    419.63 (2.22*)  -1166.7 (-1.08) 
D(POP)    0.06 (1.13)  -0.23 (-1.11)    0.01 (0.54)  -0.50 (-2.87*)    0.05 (0.78)  0.27 (1.18) 
D(USCON)    -0.07 (-2.20*)  0.07 (0.31)    0.03 (2.63*)  -0.55 (-3.00*)    -0.11 (-2.78*)  0.62 (2.52*) 
WWI or OILPERM    101.86 (4.32*)  -87.78 (-1.97*)    22.27 (2.43*)  -88.54 (-2.37*)    79.59 (2.91*)  0.76 (0.02) 
WWI aftermath    -72.42 (-3.04*)      19.6 (2.11*)      -92.02 (-3.32*)   








































ADF (1875-2000)     -8.97*    -7.08*    -7.66* 
P-value  for  shift     0.002         0.003 .00004
Notes to Table 2: *(**)  significant at 5% (at 10%). P-value for shift = P-value for F test of null that equations as a whole are not different across time. R
2 is between observed 
and predicted. ADF = univariate unit root test on equation residuals with no constant and no trend, Mackinnon (1996). ADF (1875-2000) = ADF test on residuals for combined 
model estimated over entire sample. (a) Expected signs on coefficients refer to sum of coefficients. (b) x
e =  the predicted value of (permanent) real income per capita from Table 
1b. ∆y
e = [the actual change in real GNP per capita - ∆ x 
e] . (c) r




   ∆ x
e . Instruments for all equations include all exogenous variables and {third lags of r
e, y
e  and
   ∆ x
e, first lags of variables in long run model for income (except for dum-
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N o  n-interest Expenditure
T  a  xation
All series in real dollars per capita 
 
       
 
           
Table 3: Change in Policy Differentials Dg, Dt, D∆b, 1952-2000.  (3SLS Estimation) 
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 -2  Sum-sig          D(autoT) D(autoT)-1 Shift-1980 Statistics



















2 = 0.56    
DW = 2.00 



















2 = 0.78 
DW = 1.44 



















2 = 0.79     
DW = 1.63 
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 -2  Sum-sig      Shift-1980 Statistics












101.84    -41.59
(-2.07*) 
R
2 =  0.52 
DW = 1.80 












-213.89    126.99
(4.72*) 
R
2 = 0.64 
DW = 1.22 












241.62    -168.58
(-4.58*) 
R
2 =  0.66 
DW = 1.26 
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2 =  0.52     
DW = 2.41 
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DW = 1.44 



















2 =  0.81      
DW = 1.68 
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2 = 0.55       
DW = 1.59 



















2 = 0.56       
DW = 2.08 



















2 = 0.67       
DW = 1.56 
Notes:  *(**) significant at 5% (10%). Endogenous variables:  ªy
e
u  and D(autoT). Instrumental variables: first lags of IPUS, RYPC, and y
e
u and first and second lags of URATE, all 
interacted with a dummy =1 from 1980 on, = 0 otherwise. No. of observations = 49. Sum-sig = sum of coefficients significant at least at 10%. Constant terms are not reported. R
2 is 
between observed and predicted. DW = Durbin-Watson.  Dg  (Dt, D∆b ) = estimated change in the transitory component of real non-interest spending per capita (real taxes per capita, 
real net deficit per capita) minus the forecast of the same variable 'after Keynes' based on our model of  the transitory component 'before Keynes'. )y
e
u = first difference of  (the current 
unemployment rate less the lagged value of  the four year moving average of  the unemployment rate). D(autoT) = first difference of (the lagged value of the four year moving average of  







Estimated Changes in Keynesian Policy Following a Standard Shock 





Using two periods 
(1871-1938 and 1947-
2000) to estimate x  
Using the entire sample 
(1871-2000) to estimate x 
 
Welfare state unrelated to Keynesianism: 
panel 1, Table 3 
real dollars per capita 
 
sig. at 10%   all coeffs 
real dollars per capita 
 
sig. at 10%     all coeffs 
change in noninterest spending  107.5 133.3 -43.3  -16.3 
change in taxation  -104.5 -88.5  -106.0  -106.5 
change in net deficit  183.1  221.5  -3.6  90.3 
Welfare state part of Keynesianism:  
 panel 2, Table 3       
change in noninterest spending 154.8 188.8 34.1  102.7 
change in taxation  -325.1 238.8  -90.5  -147.0 
change in net deficit   367.3  427.7  144.4  197.9 
  Notes: x = estimate of long run income (as in Table 1b), a distributed lag on which is used to estimate expected 
long run income x
e;  sig. at 10% = use of coefficients on )y
e




Some Important Sample Statistics, 1952-2000 
 




x estimated using two periods: 
 estimated real gnp per capita (x) 







x estimated using entire sample: 
 estimated real gnp per capita (x)







estimated expected transitory unemployment (y
e
u)  0.24  1.52 
      real noninterest public expen. per capita (g) 2466.0  819.8 
real taxation per capita (t) 2422.8  816.2 
real net deficit per capita (ªb!rb-1) 43.2  446.7 
Notes: See notes to Table 4a. All figures in real dollars per capita. y = (actual real GNP  
per capita - x), a distributed lag on which is used to estimate expected transitory income y







1.   Variable Names  
AGRIC = proportion of the labor force in agriculture 
  
∆b = real primary deficit per capita = g + real net interest per 
capita paid to the private sector - t 
 
  = permanent or long run real primary deficit per capita  ˆ ∆ b
 
D(autoT) = first difference of  (the lagged value of the four      
year moving average of the ratio of  personal income tax 
revenue to total tax revenue) times (the contemporaneous 
change in real income per capita).  
 
g = real government spending per capita 
 
ˆ g = long run or permanent size of real government                   
x  expenditure per capita   
IMMRATIO = immigrants as a fraction of total population 
 
IPIUS = index of industrial production for the United States  
 
OILPERM = dummy 1 for 1974 on, 0 otherwise 
 
OPEN = (exports + imports)/GNP  
 
%YOUNG = percentage of the population below 17  
 
P = GNP deflator before 1927 and GDP deflator after (1986 
= 100)  
 
POP = Canadian population 
  
RYPC = real income (GNP) per capita 
r = long term government bond rate -  the actual rate of 
inflation (using P) 
r
e = expected real interest rate (based on a distributed lag 
on r) 
 
Shift-1980 = 1 for the years 1980-2000, 0 otherwise 
 
t = real tax revenue per capita 
 
ˆ t = long run or permanent taxes per capita  
 
URATE = the unemployment rate 
 
USCON = U.S. real consumption per capita 
 
WW1= dummy 1 for the years 1914-1918, 0 otherwise. 
WWI aftermath = dummy1 for the years 1919-1921, 0  
otherwise. 
WW2 = dummy 1 for the years 1939-1945, 0 otherwise. 
WWII aftermath = dummy 1 for the years 1946-1949, 0 
otherwise. 
 
x = estimate of long run real income per capita 
x
e = expected long run real income per capita (based on a 
distributed lag on x)  
 
y = calculated transitory income = RYPC–x
y
e = expected transitory income (based on a distributed lag 
on y)  
∆
e
u y = change in the expected transitory or shorter run 
component of unemployment 
 
For data sources, see J. Stephen Ferris and Stanley L. Winer (2003). "Searching for Keynes: With Application to Canada, 1870-
2000". Munich: CESifo Working Paper No. 1016, August. Sources are also available from the authors on request. The fiscal data 
are based on Gillespie's (1991) reworking of the Public Accounts of Canada from 1867, updated by the authors.. 
 
The following material is available in Ferris and Winer (2003) and is provided here for the benefit of referees.  
2.  Linearization of First Order Conditions (7) - (9) 
 
We proceed by taking Taylor series approximations of the left hand side of equations (23) for the policy variables g and t. Here we 
show the detail for the case of government spending only and expand about the long-run path of g, given the expected values of the 
permanent influences on government size, when the expected transitory deviations from the equilibrium path are equal to zero. 









t+s-1= 0, ...), defined by solving the Lagrangian (15) for policies of period t+s-1 and t+s under the specified conditions. For 
this purpose we consider the left side of (24) to be a function of expected quantities x
e and y
e. Terminating the expansion after the 
set of second order terms, we find that the Taylor series expansion of the left hand side of (11)  becomes: 
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where we have simplified by assuming that the indirect utility function is separable in the policy instruments so that the  
cross partial terms are all zero.  
 
To evaluate this expression, we assume that the expected marginal utility generated by a change in the policy variable is linearly 












t+s , where the scalars a and c 
are positive and both b and d are negative. (The analogous assumptions about the effects of taxes and debt are also made.) 
Additional government spending then generates positive utility along the equilibrium path, but produces less additional value for 
larger positive values of both transitory and permanent income. These are assumptions of convenience in the present discussion - 
the empirical work allows b and d to take either sign. 
 
Because the difference in logarithms equals the rate of growth of the inside variables, the first term of the expansion in (A1) when 
evaluated at ^ gt+s and ^ gt+s-1 becomes  
 
ee ee
t+s t+s-1 t+s t+s-1
12 e
t+s-1 tt t + s - 1 gg
 b  ( a    a )   +   d  (    ) d  (  ) xx xx  =   .
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γ γ µµ
                                               (A2) 
 
Repeating the use of linear marginal utility to evaluate the first order derivatives in (A1) from (24) and combining these with (A2), 
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  x
ρ− ψ
                      (A3) 
 
It may be noted here that while similar variables have coefficients with the same general form across time in (A3),  
all coefficients are time dated and become equal only if the state variables are equal in adjacent periods.  The same  
general form holds for tt+s. We can rearrange (A3) to solve explicitly for g
e
t+1 (and for tt+s). Using X
e
t+s to represent the time dated 
term representing the weighted sum of the first derivatives, X
e
t+s = γa+ c+dx
e
t+s > 0, we have   
 
e
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t+s-1 = γa+ c+dx
e






-1 . 1.  In addition, we assumed earlier that My/Mg
e
t +s-1 . My/Mge t+s. Using these approximations and rearranging, (A4) 
reduces to 
ee ee
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where ∆g









t+s =  γa+c+dx
e






Finally, (A5) can be given one further useful simplification.  Inspection of (9) indicates that Dln(ψt+s) is a function of yt+s  
through Etµ
1   
b   .  Assuming that the relationship is linear allows us to write Dln(ψt+s) = φ (yt+s - yt+s-1) > 0 with φ > 0. Hence  
(A5) becomes
33
                                                 
32 Here MEtµ1g /Mgt+s= γb(Mye/Mg) is assumed to be independent of the size of ye;  MEtµ2g /Mgt+s = d(Mxet+s/Mgt+s) = 0; 
MEtµ1g/Myt+s = γb; and MEtµ2g/Myt+s= 0. 
33 From (9), using Eµ
2





b (yt+s) - β Etµ    
1
b    (y t+s+1)] > 0 if and only if the liquidity constraint is  
expected to be increasingly binding. That is, as yt+s increases relative to yt+s+1, Etµ
1
b (yt+s) and D(ψt+s+1) falls. The resulting 
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e < 0. In interpreting the sign of Zt+s, recall that y
e is defined so that positive values represent 
levels of aggregate output above their long run expected level. Thus if an increase in g
e increases y
e, (My/Mgt+s)
e > 0. Our discussion 
below relies on this assumption (although the estimating equations allow for either sign). Since X
e
t+s > 0 and b < 0, Zt+s < 0. This 





34   
 
Finally, since b < 0,  d < 0 and γ > 0, the effect of an increase in (x
e
t+s - x
e t+s-1) on the difference between the current and long run 
values of )g is negative. Equation (A6) and its counterparts for current taxation and deficit financing become the basis for 
estimating equations (12)-(14). Note that while no constant term appears in (A6), one is added in the estimating equations by 
separating the first term on the right side of each equation (ρ - r
e
t+s ) into a part that depends on ρ, assumed constant, and a part that 
depends on r
e
t+s.. Allowing the constant term to vary freely provides further flexibility in the construction of a proxy for r
e, as well 
as for expectations of the y's and the x's. 
 
Summary of Definitions and Assumptions Used in the Derivation of Equations 
λ = N1 /N > 0     
γ = N1α1 / (N1α1 +Nα2 ) < 1 
α h = MFh t/M(Et (U
h(k)) = 1/(φmax - φmin) 
θ1 =Nt λ α1,  θ2  = Nt(1-λ) α2. 
µ






2)/Mbt = 0 
Etµ
1
g = a + b@y
e
t+s  > 0;  a > 0, b < 0 
Etµ
2
g = c + d@x
e
+s > 0; c > 0, d < 0 
Eµ
1
t = e + f @y
e
t+s  < 0;  e < 0, f  > 0  
Eµ
2
t = h + k @x
e
+s < 0;  h < 0, k > 0 
M(θ1Etµ
1)/Mbt … 0 
M(θ2Etµ
2)/Mbt = 0 
My/Mgt+s-1 = My/Mgt+s  > 0 
My/Mtt+s-1  = My/Mtt+s   < 0  
(M
2y/Mtt+s
2)  <  0 
X
e
+s = γ@a + c + d@ x
e
+s   > 0 
X
e
t+s-1 = γ@a + c + d@x
e










-1  γ@ b@ (My/Mgt+s)




-1  γ@ f @(My/Mtt+s)
e    > 0  
V
e
t+s =  γ@e + h + k @x
e
t+s <  0 
 
3. On the interpretation of Keynes 
 
Textbook Keynesian in the above framework would arise from a new understanding by voters that a co-ordinated reduction in the 
impact of liquidity constraints would allow constrained agents to realize more of their Anotional@ trading plans, thereby opening 
new market opportunities for both liquidity and non-liquidity constrained individuals, and increasing individual expected welfare. 
In other words, greater attempts at stabilization could arise through individuals’ enhanced appreciation of the potential role of 
government as an agent that is able to internalize externalities inherent in relaxing individual liquidity constraints through fiscal 
and other policies. Keynesianism in this sense follows Leijonhufvud’s (1968) seminal interpretation of Keynes.
 
Greater recognition by the community of the desirability of using government in this way increases the expected utility generated 
by government action and, hence, the expected political benefit of using fiscal policy to depart from the desired equilibrium path. 
Specifically, with Eµ
1
g = a + b y
e
t [with a > 0 and b < 0], a rise in the value to the community of using g in relation to the liquidity 
constraint will increase the reason for actual government spending to depart from its equilibrium path in response to a given ªy
e
t+s.  
A rise in the value of either a or b then increases the absolute value of the coefficient on the third right-hand term in equation (A6). 
An analogous argument holds for ∆t
e and for the change in the net deficit.  
This means that 'after Keynes', both the negative correlation between the (∆gt - ∆g ˆ t) and ∆y
e
t+s (where a positive change in y is a 
good event) and the positive correlation of (∆tt - ∆t ˆ
t) and ∆y
e
t+s will be stronger. Thus the implied negative correlation for the 
deficit will also be larger. 
 
It should be noted that a rise in the expected utility that would be generated by government actions is to be distinguished  
from an increase in the effectiveness of fiscal intervention on the economy, i.e., a rise in My/Mgt+s. Using (A6) it can be seen  
that such a productivity change actually reduces government intervention. On the margin, no more resources will be devoted to 
dealing with liquidity constraints than are necessary. The intuition for this result is explained in the main text.  
 
Finally, we note that a change in the proportion of  liquidity constrained voters λ yields inconclusive effects on policy, and so does 
not clearly lead to Keynesian stabilization in the present framework. 
                                                 
34  That is, with φ > 0, (X
e
t+s)
-1 γb < 0 so that [φ - (X
e
t+s)
-1 γb] > 0.  
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